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RESUMEN 
En este trabajo analizamos los resultados de un estudio experimental 
llevado a cabo con políticos profesionales que se enfrentan a una 
serie de problemas de decisión bajo riesgo. Específicamente, 
comprobamos la existencia de violaciones de la teoría de la elección 
racional tales como el efecto de punto de referencia, la aversión a las 
pérdidas, los efectos marco y el efecto de common ratio en este 
grupo de expertos. Sus elecciones violan la teoría de la utilidad 
esperada aunque parecen ser más racionales y menos aversos al 
(amantes del) riesgo en el dominio de las ganancias (pérdidas) que 
los estudiantes. 
Palabras clave: Efecto de selección de muestra, expertos, utilidad 
esperada, teoría prospectiva.  
 
ABSTRACT 
We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These 
political experts face political choice problems under risk and 
probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of 
rational choice theory  -the reference point effect, loss aversion, 
framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the 
field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they 
appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain 
of gains (losses) than student subjects. 
 
Keywords: Subject-pool effect; experts; expected utility; prospect 
theory.  
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1-Introduction 
The use of non-experienced, student subjects is common practice in 
experiments. Skeptics of experimental results often reproach for this,1 such 
that a broad range of experimental settings, as public goods, coordination 
games and auctions, have been replicated with professionals from the field.2 
So far, only few systematic differences have been verified between experts and 
non-experienced subjects in the laboratory. However, the literature do not yet 
provide a sufficient representation of experts’ preferences and decisions which 
would allow the assumption that they in fact coincide with those of non-
experienced subjects. As Potters and van Winden (2000, p. 501) point out, 
“many of these studies involve markets, which do not represent situations 
most likely to elicit differences in subject-pools.” Environments which involve 
probability and risk are much more prone to anomalous results, as Ball and 
Cech (1993) remark, such that they recommend the replication of such 
experimental studies with subjects from “more representative populations.” 
In this paper, we report on a replication of Quattrone and Tversky 
(1988)’s experimental study of political decision making under probability and 
risk. Subjects face non-market situations in which they make a political choice 
as, for instance, on the allocation of a public resource. We use politicians (who 
all hold a PhD in economics) as subjects and compare their decisions to both 
the results of Quattrone and Tversky and our economics and labor classes. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the role of 
expertise in a political choice experiment. 
We test the basic principles of expected utility theory against its 
descriptive alternative prospect theory. Particularly, we examine the reference-
point effect, loss aversion, the framing effect, and the common ratio effect in 
the context of political decisions. There are at least three motivations why we 
focus on Quattrone and Tversky (1988)’s study: First, as pointed out above, 
there is some evidence in the experimental literature on subject-pool effects 
that professionals may evaluate environments under risk and probability 
differently than students. The data of Anderson and Sunder (1995), Dyer et al. 
(1989) and Potters and van Winden (2000) suggest that professionals behave 
                                                           
1 See Kinder and Palfrey (1993) and Plott (1982) for a discussion. 
2 For instance, Burns (1985), Abdolmohammadi and Wright (1987), DeJong et al. (1988), 
Mestelman and Feeny (1988), Dyer et al. (1989), Lo et al. (1993), Anderson and Sunder (1995), 
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more rational in the sense of theory and less risk averse than student 
subjects. Yet, as far as we know, no experimental study has made an attempt 
to study experts’ decisions under risk or uncertainty. Particularly important in 
this context appears the fact that former experiments with experts focused 
only on the domain of gains and disregarded the domain of losses. A huge 
body of literature, psychological and economic, provided evidence that 
behavior may be different if the outcomes are perceived as losses or as gains.3 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed 
prospect theory -a descriptive theory of choice under risk- on this fundamental 
observation. Second, Quattrone and Tversky reported systematic deviations of 
non-experienced subjects from what expected utility theory would designate 
rational behavior. These deviations from the rational choice may thoroughly 
disappear with expertise.4 Third, and finally, the considerable differences in 
culture and academic training between our subject-pool and the one of 
Quattrone and Tversky seem to demand differences in responses. On one 
hand, the US, where the original experiment was run, have a much higher 
standard of living index and a lower unemployment rate than Spain. Possible 
influences of cultural differences on decision making in experiments have been 
observed by the literature. For instance, Brandts, Saijo and Schram (2002) 
found that Spanish students are more individualistic in public goods 
experiments than Americans.5 On the other hand, there is some evidence that 
economist-subjects behave differently.6 For all these reasons, we reckon that it 
is quite possible that our outcomes can differ to those of Quattrone and 
Tversky. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the experimental 
design and alludes to the different subject-pools. Section 3 describes the 
experiment and reports the findings of our research. Section 4 summarizes the 
main results and concludes. 
 
                                                           
3  Starmer (2000) provides a survey over the literature. 
4 Or to the contrary, violations of expected utility theory may augment. Bone et al (1999) 
suggest that repetition and group discussion increase Allais-type deviations from rationality. 
5 Brandts, Saijo and Schram (2002) observation has been confirmed recently by Fatas, 
Neugebauer and Perote (2003). Also, Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1995) and 
Buchan, Johnson and Croson (2002) reported significant differences across culture in 
bargaining and investment experiments, respectively. 
6 Marwell and Ames (1981) report that economics students behave in public goods experiments 
more “rational” than their control group of psychology and sociology students. Isaac, McCue, 
and Plott (1985), however, failed to reproduce such evidence. 
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2-The political decision-making experiment 
2.1-The expert subjects (ES) 
We first define what we mean by an expert in political choices. For the purpose 
of our paper, an expert is a subject with a certain degree of experience in 
political decisions. For example, someone with knowledge and experience in 
public allocation processes and economic policy decisions. We can think of two 
groups to which this definition applies: politicians and bureaucrats. Potters 
and van Winden (2000) dealt with bureaucrats (civil servants), whereas we 
focus on the case of politicians.  
The politicians in our experiment had all some level of real public 
experience. They were either public administration officials or economic policy 
advisors, or both. Thus, they had a direct relationship with policy making. 
Moreover, they were or have been members of one of the Spanish public 
universities and all held a PhD in economics. They were or had been elected 
directly by voters or indirectly by political representatives to be in charge of 
some public department. The list of directly political positions occupied by our 
expert subject-pool included the four elected parliaments and cabinets directly 
chosen in Spain (European Parliament, Spanish National Parliament, Regional 
Parliament and Local Councils) and some non-direct mandates (as in case of 
mayors, who have to be elected directly by the majority of the town 
councilors).7 
Note that all political experts had been in charge of big public budgets 
and, therefore, had been involved in decisions directly related to public 
spending or economic policies. The budgets over which they made their 
decisions were usually on a scale of billions of Euro.8  
In the experiment, 32 expert subjects participated. They were personally 
invited and participated voluntarily. The instructions and questionnaires were 
delivered to them personally or send by mail. Responses were anonymously 
submitted to the experimenter in blank envelopes. 
                                                           
7 Mayors and councilors were from towns of 50.000 to 750.000 inhabitants. The list of non-
direct positions held by our expert subject-pool included: the economic policy advisory unit of 
the Spanish prime minister, members of the regional governmental cabinets, political 
controllers of Spanish public banks, budget officers of regional governments, general economic 
and finance managers of regional governments, general managers of the public auditing 
institutes of regional governments and board members of the national trade unions. 
8 As it is the case of some town councils, budgetary offices, the three parliaments, or the 
economic advisory unit of the prime minister. 
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2.2-The non-experienced subjects (NES) 
At the time of the experiment,  the second subject-pool, i.e., the non-
experienced subjects, were undergraduates of Economics and Labor at the 
University of Valencia. None of them had any experience neither with politics 
(other than being young voters) nor with the participation in an experiment.  
In total, 309 students participated voluntarily. The experiment was 
conducted in the classroom. They read the instructions and filled out their 
questionnaires. The procedure was confidential and anonymous, and the 
setting resembled the one of Quattrone and Tversky (1988). Respondents (non-
experienced as much as experts) were asked to imagine actually facing the 
choice described, and they were assured that there was no correct or incorrect 
answer. 
2.3-Subjects of Quattrone and Tversky (1988) 
Quattrone and Tversky do not allude to their subject-pool other than they were 
undergraduates at Stanford University or at the University of California at 
Berkeley. It is quite likely that they were from the psychological or sociological 
faculty. The experiment was in a classroom setting. 
 
3-The Experimental Design and the Results 
In what follows, we report on the answers to five problems involving political 
candidates and public referenda which replicate the research of Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) in our subject-pools. The problems are used to test the 
predictions of expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954) against Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)’s prospect theory. We proceed in the same way as Quattrone and 
Tversky and collect the experimental data by means of hypothetical questions. 
The troubles with this approach have been noticed already by Quattrone and 
Tversky (p. 720), 
 
[…] The use of hypothetical problems raises obvious questions regarding 
the generality and the applicability of the finding. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the use of carefully worded questions can address key 
issues regarding people’s values and beliefs so long as respondents take 
the questions seriously and have no particular reason to disguise or 
  3centrA:
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misrepresent their true preferences. Our results, of course, do not 
provide definitive conclusion about political decision making, but they 
may shed light on the formation of political judgement and stimulate 
new hypotheses that can be tested in national election surveys in the 
years to come. […] 
 
Indeed, for the purpose of testing the internal validity of Quattrone and 
Tversky’s experimental results this problem appears of minor importance. The 
outcomes of the questionnaires are summarized below in Table 1. 
 
3.1-The Reference Point Effect 
Expected utility theory predicts risk aversion (introduced by Bernoulli (1738)) 
implying a concave shape of the utility function. The “value function” of 
prospect theory, in contrast, is s-shaped: subjects exhibit risk aversion in the 
domain of gains, and risk seeking in the domain of losses.9 Prospect theory 
thus claims that the decision maker’s choice depends on the point of 
reference, whether the feasible outcomes are perceived as gains or as losses. 
This idea is now widely accepted, and may be an important step in explaining 
real economic behavior in the field as Heath et al. (1998) suggest.  
Quattrone and Tversky (1988) illustrate the phenomenon of a reference 
point in political choice in a between-subjects treatment. One group faced the 
following problem 1A (the numbers of respondents to this and all following 
problems is given in parenthesis: the number of experts, non-experienced 
subjects and subjects of Quattrone and Tversky, respectively), another group 
faced problem 1B: 
 
Problem 1A (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=147, n(QT)=89) 
 
Suppose there is a continent consisting of five nations: Alpha, Beta 
Gamma, Delta and Epsilon. The nations all have very similar systems of 
government and economics, are long time members of a continental 
common market, and are therefore expected to produce very similar 
                                                           
9 Prospect theory predicts that people, on one hand, prefer $1.000 with certainty over a fair 
chance of winning $2.000 or nothing (risk aversion in the domain of gains). On the other hand, 
people prefer a fair chance of losing $2.000 or nothing to a certain loss of $1.000 (risk seeking 
in the domain of losses). 
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standards of living and rates of inflation. Imagine you are a citizen of 
Alpha, which is about to hold its presidential election. The two presidential 
candidates, Brown and Green, differ from each other primarily in the 
economic policies they are known to favor and are sure to implement. 
These policies were studied by Alpha’s two leading economists who are of 
equal expertise and are impartial as to the result of the election. After 
studying the policies advocated by Brown and Green and the policies 
currently being pursued by the other four nations, each economist made a 
forecast. The forecast consisted of three predictions about the expected 
standard of living index (SLI). The SLI measures the goods and services 
consumed (directly or indirectly) by the average citizen yearly. It is 
expressed in Continental Monetary Units (CMU) per capita so that the 
higher the SLI the higher the level of economic prosperity. The three 
projections concerned 
 
1. the average SLI to be expected among the nations Beta, Gamma, Delta 
and Epsilon 
2. the SLI to be expected by following Brown’s economic policy 
3. the SLI to be expected by following Green’s economic policy 
 
The forecasts made by each economist are summarized in the following 
table: 
     
  Projected SLI in CMU per Capita 






Economist 1  43.000  65.000  51.000 
Economist 2  45.000  43.000  53.000 
 
Suppose that as a citizen of Alpha you were asked to cast your vote for 
Brown or Green. On the exclusive basis of the information provided, whom 
would you vote for? [Brown, ES: 67%, NES: 21%, QT: 28%; Green, ES: 
33%, NES: 89%, QT: 72%] 
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The other group of respondents received an identical problem with the 
difference that the forecasts about the other four nations were altered. 
 
Problem 1B (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=162, n(QT)=96) 
 
  Projected SLI in AMU per Capita 






Economist 1  63.000  65.000  51.000 
Economist 2  65.000  43.000  53.000 
[Brown, ES: 41%, NES: 17%, QT: 50%; Green, ES: 59%, NES: 83%, QT: 50%] 
 
Note that the policies of Brown and Green should yield about the same 
expected value, but Brown’s policy appears riskier than that of Green. 
Quattrone and Tversky point out that the average SLI for the other four 
countries should be perceived as a point of reference, since all five nations 
were said to have a similar living standard. The reference point in problem 1A 
and in 1B should then be about 44.000 and 64.000 CMU, respectively. 
Outcomes projected for Brown and Green would, therefore, be treated as gains 
in the former problem and as losses in the latter one. As Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) indicate, prospect theory predicts more votes for Green in 
problem 1A (risk aversion in the domain of gains) than in problem 1B (risk 
seeking in the domain of losses). The reference point should be irrelevant if 
subjects behaved according to the classical rational choice theory -expected 
utility theory- which would predict equivalent proportions of political choices 
between both problems. 
Quattrone and Tversky (1988) find significant support for a reference 
point (p=.004 by chi square) implying modal choices of problem 1A and 1B 
consistent with prospect theory. Much to our surprise our data yield different 
results. On one hand, the observed responses of our NES suggest no reference 
point effect as proposed by prospect theory (p=.604 by chi square).10 On the 
other hand, the data of the ES do not support prospect theory (p=.861 by 
                                                           
10 We conclude that in the NES the choice between the two candidates was not significantly 
influenced by the projected SLI in the other countries. This observation might have a cultural 
background. The Spanish prefer less paid but permanent positions over well paid but less 
secure ones. From this perspective, it might not seem so surprising that most NES choose the 
less risky candidate. 
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Fisher), since the modal choices contradict to its prediction. Thus, if the 
existence of a reference point can be assumed our data suggested that experts 
are risk loving in the domain of gains and risk averse in the domain of losses. 
As remarked above, there is some evidence in the experimental literature that 
experts are less risk averse than student subjects (see Dyer et al. (1989)) in the 
domain of gains. Our data support this finding. We do not know about 
experimental studies that examine risk attitudes of experts in the domain of 
losses, so we cannot place our finding in the context of the literature. 
Nevertheless, in the next paragraph we allude also to this issue. 
3.2 Loss Aversion 
 
In prospect theory the value function is steeper for losses than for 
corresponding gains, i.e., -v(-x) > v(x). Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) call this 
property -that the displeasure of losing money is greater than the pleasure of 
winning the same amount of money- the principle of loss aversion. As an 
important consequence of loss aversion, a certain payoff (the status quo) is 
preferred to a risky one with the same expected value. The same statement, 
however, is also consistent with the concavity of the utility function. In 
classical utility theory, yet, the greater impact of losses than of gains is 
necessarily coupled with the presence of risk. Thus, we are able to 
discriminate between prospect theory and expected utility theory, because loss 
aversion applies in prospect theory also to riskless choices. Loss aversion (in 
the present analysis) implies that the status quo policy is not perceived as 
neutral, but that it is higher evaluated than the policy with the same expected 
value. Therefore, people will only switch to a new policy if they strictly prefer it 
to the old one. This pattern -that the incumbent politician has an advantage 
over the rival candidate- should be illustrated by the following pair of 
problems. 
 
Problem 2A  (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=147, n(QT)= 91) 
 
Imagine there were another presidential contest between two new 
candidates, Frank and Carl. Frank wishes to keep the level of inflation 
and unemployment at their current level. The rate inflation is currently at 
9% and the rate of unemployment is at 15%. Carl  proposes a policy that 
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would decrease the rate of inflation by 3%  while increasing the rate of 
unemployment by 7 %. Suppose that as a citizen of Alpha, you were asked 
to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. Please indicate your vote.11 
[Frank, ES: 100%, NES: 63%, QT: 65%; Carl, ES: 0%, NES: 37%, QT: 
35%] 
 
Problem 2B (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=162, n(QT)=89) 
 
Carl wishes to keep the level of inflation and unemployment at their 
current level. The rate of inflation is currently at 6% and the rate of 
unemployment is at 22%. Frank proposes a policy that would increase the 
rate of inflation by 3% while decreasing the rate of unemployment by 7%.  
[Frank, ES: 82%, NES: 67%, QT: 39%; Carl, ES: 18%, NES: 33%, QT: 
61%] 
 
Note that the rates of inflation and unemployment implied by Frank’s 
[Carl’s] policy are 15% [22%] and 9% [6%], respectively. Only the location of 
the status quo differs between problems, which coincides in the former 
problem with Frank’s policy and in the latter one with Carl’s policy. Quattrone 
and Tversky (1988) report that the modal response to both problem induced 
the status quo (p=.001 by chi-square) favoring prospect theory over expected 
utility theory. In our subject-pools, however, the majority voted Frank whose 
policy implied less unemployment. The differences of choices were insignificant 
between problems for either subject-pool (ES: p=.137 by Fisher; NES: p=.612 
by chi-square). It should be noted that the experts unanimously chose Frank’s 
policy in Problem 2A, but only 82% did so in Problem 2B. It is quite possible 
that insignificance in the test results from the small sample size. However, 
from these observations we are not able to support the notion of multiattribute 
loss aversion as proposed by Quattrone and Tversky. 
3.3-Invariance 
 
                                                           
11 The indicated levels differ from Quattrone and Tversky (1988) to increase realism of the task. 
Frank’s [Carl’s] policy of Quattrone and Tversky involved inflation and unemployment rates of 
42% [23%] and 15% [22%], respectively. Spain’s levels of inflation and unemployment rates 
were 7.5% and 18.5% at the time of the experiment and the estimated elasticity between 
inflation and unemployment was 3/7.  
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The next  part of the questionnaire was dedicated to the analysis of possibly 
the most fundamental assumption of rational choice: the principle of 
invariance. The principle of invariance demands that the preference order 
among prospects does not depend on how the outcomes and probabilities are 
described implying that two alternative phrasings of an equivalent problem 
yield the same choice.12 In what follows we consider equivalent problems in 
which violations of invariance cannot be justified on normative grounds. We 
suspect that politicians in their profession employ not infrequently verbal 
framing to their personal advantage. In our opinion, politicians are expectedly 
much less prone to framing than non-experienced subjects, and hence their 
responses should not violate the invariance prediction of expected utility. This 
issue is addressed in the following pair of problems:13 
 
Problem 3A (n(ES)=15, n(NES)=166, n(QT)=126) 
 
Political decision making often involves a considerable number of trade-
offs. A program that benefits one segment of the population may work for 
the disadvantage of another segment. Policies designed to lead to higher 
rates of employment have an adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were 
faced with the decision of adopting one of two economic policies. 
If program J is adopted, 10% of the work force would be 
unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%. If program K is 
adopted, 5% of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of 
inflation would be 17%. The following table summarizes the alternative 








Rate of  
Inflation 
(%) 
Program J  10  12 
Program K  5  17 
 
                                                           
12 Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Lindman (1971) reported violation of procedure invariance 
(so-called “preference reversal”). 
13 These problems are numbered 9 and 10 in Quattrone and Tversky (1988). 
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Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program J or 
program K. With the provided information. Which would you select? 
[Program J, ES: 20%, NES: 81%, QT: 36%; Program K, ES: 80%, NES: 
19%, QT: 64%] 
 








Rate of  
Inflation 
(%) 
Program J  90  12 
Program K  95  17 
[Program J, ES: 50%, NES: 69%, QT: 54%; Program K, ES: 50%, 
NES: 31%, QT: 46%] 
 
The data of Quattrone and Tversky (1988) show a change of the modal 
response from program K in the former problem to program J in the latter one. 
The preference reversal is significant (p=.004 by chi-square). This apparently 
higher sensitivity of choice to the unemployment rate rather than to the 
employment rate is according to Quattrone and Tversky (p. 728) a 
“psychophysical effect” which they term “ratio-difference principle.” The ratio-
difference describes in this context the ratio of a change from program J to K 
yielding a factor of 2 (=10%/5%) in problem 3A and a factor of .947 
(=90%/95%) in 3B. Quattrone and Tversky conclude that the greater the ratio-
difference the greater is the impact on perception. Consequently, program K 
would be more focal in the problem 3A than in 3B. 
To our surprise, and against our intuition, the data of our expert 
subject-pool exhibit a significant increase of votes for program J from problem 
3A to 3B in favor of the ratio-difference principle (p=.085 by Fisher). For the 
NES sample, however, the ratio-difference principle can not be supported 
(p=.983 by chi-square). 
3.4-Framing 
 
As Quattrone and Tversky emphasize, the ratio-difference principle has 
many applications to political choice. The following pair of problems should 
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demonstrate how negative or positive framing of statistics may influence 
people’s perceived need for the provision of public goods. 
 
Problem 4A (n(ES)=14, n(NES)=146, n(QT)=125) 
 
The country of Delta is deeply interested in reducing the crime rate 
among its immigrants groups. The Department of Justice has been 
allocated 100 million of Delta’s Monetary Units (DMU 100M) for 
establishing a crime prevention program aimed at immigrant youths. The 
program would provide the youths with job opportunities and recreational 
facilities, inasmuch as criminal acts tend to be committed by unemployed 
youths who have little to do with their time. A decision must be made 
between two programs currently being considered. The programs differ 
from each other primarily in how the DMU 100M would be distributed 
between Delta’s two largest immigrant communities, the Alphans and the 
Betans. There are roughly the same number of Alphans and Betans in 
Delta. Statistics have shown that by the age of 25, 3.7% of all Alphans 
have a criminal record, whereas 1.2% of all Betans have a criminal record. 
The following two programs are being considered. Program J would 
allocate to the Alphan community DMU 55M and to the Betan community 
DMU 45M. Program K would allocate DMU 65M to the Alphan community 
and to the Betan community DMU 35M. The following table summarizes 








Program J  55M  45M 
Program K  65M  35M 
 
Imagine you were faced with the decision between program J and 
program K. In light of the available crime statistics, which would you 
select? [Program J, ES: 50%, NES: 42%, QT: 41%; Program K, ES: 50%, 
NES: 58%, QT: 59%] 
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The respondents of the second group received an identical problem with 
the only difference that the statistical records of both communities were now 
positively framed: 
 
Problem 4B (n(ES)=17, n(NES)=156, n(QT)=126) 
 
Statistics have shown that by the age of 25, 96.3% of all Alphans 
have no criminal record, whereas 98.8% of all Betans have no criminal 
record. [Program J, ES: 71%, NES: 77%, QT: 71%; Program K, ES: 29%, 
NES: 23%, QT: 29%] 
 
Quattrone and Tversky observed a large reversal of preferences (p=.000 by chi-
square). The relative frequencies in our study suggest basically the same 
sensitivity to framing as in Quattrone and Tversky. The data of the NES 
provide evidence for a similar extent of preference reversals (p=.000 by chi-
square). In the case of the ES the differences seem to be not large enough to be 
statistically significant (p=.212 by Fisher).  
3.5-The Common Ratio Effect  
 
In the early fifties, Allais (1953) introduced two examples to the economics 
literature in which actual choice behavior may systematically deviate from the 
predictions of expected utility theory. One of these anomalies reported by 
Allais, the so-called common ratio effect, has challenged the assumption of 
well-defined preferences. The common ratio effect is usually presented in a 
pair of binary choice problems under risk in which one binary choice problem 
is derived from the other by multiplying the winning probability with a 
common factor. People violate expected utility theory if this common ratio 
modification of the winning probability induces a change in choice.  
The last part of the questionnaire addressed this kind of observed 
violations of expected utility theory in a within-subject treatment, i.e., 
respondents reply to both problems. 
 
Problem 5A (n(ES)=32, n(NES)=308, n(QT)=88) 
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The state of Epsilon is interested in developing clean and safe 
alternative sources of energy. Its Department of Natural Resources is 
considering two programs for establishing solar energy within the state. If 
program X is adopted, then it is virtually certain that over the next four 
years the state will save 20 million of Continental Monetary Units (CMU 
20M) in energy expenditures. If program Y is adopted, then there is a 80% 
chance that the state will save CMU 30M in energy expenditures over the 
next four years and a 20% chance that because of cost overruns, the 
program will produce no savings in energy expenditures at all. The 
following table summarizes the alternative policies and their probable 
consequences. 
 
Policy  Savings in Energy Expenditures 
X  CMU 20M with certainty 
Y  80% chance of saving CMU 30M, 
20% chance of no savings 
 
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program X or 
program Y. Which would you select? [X, ES: 62.5%, NES: 59%, QT: 74%; 
Y, ES: 37.5%, NES: 41%, QT: 26%] 
 
Problem 5B (n(ES)=32, n(NES)=308, n(QT)=88) 
 
The state of Gamma is also interested in developing clean and safe 
alternative sources of energy. Its Department of Natural Resources is 
considering two programs for establishing solar energy within the state. If 
program A is adopted, then there is a 25% chance that over the next four 
years the state will save 20 million of Continental Monetary Units (CMU 
20M) in energy expenditures and a 75% chance that because of cost 
overruns, the program will produce no savings in energy expenditures at 
all. If program B is adopted, there is a 20% chance that the state will save 
CMU 30M in energy expenditures and an 80% chance that because of cost 
overruns, the program will produce no savings in energy expenditures at 
all. The following table summarizes the alternative policies and their 
probable consequences. 
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Policy  Savings in Energy Expenditures 
A  25% chance of EMU 20M savings, 
75% chance of no savings 
B  20% chance of EMU 30M savings, 
80% chance of no savings 
 
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program A or 
program B. Which would you select? [A, ES: 75%, NES: 53%, QT: 39%; B, ES: 
25%, NES: 47%, QT: 61%] 
 
Note that problem 5B is derived from 5A by applying the common ratio 
of one fourth to the probability of savings. The rational choices imply either the 
combinations XA or YB, whereas the other combined choices violate expected 
utility theory. A surprising result is that 31% of the experts infringe the 
prediction, thus, rationality cannot be supported. Nevertheless, the null 
hypothesis that the experts’ choices are as likely consistent as inconsistent 
with expected utility theory can be rejected (p=.025 by binomial) in favor of the 
alternative that they choose rather rationally. In contrast, 50% and 49% of the 
non-experienced subject pool and of Quattrone and Tversky, respectively, 
choose consistent with rational choice theory. The alternative of significantly 
more rational choices than expected by chance can not be accepted (NES: 
p=.523; QT: p=.625 by binomial). Hence, we find (weak) evidence that experts 
choose in experiments more rationally than non-experienced subjects, and 
corroborate, thus, the results of Potters and van Winden (2000) for decisions 
under risk. 
As to the violations of utility theory, we observe in both subject-pools a 
higher frequency of the choice combination XB than of YA, the former being 
consistent with prospect theory. This is in accord with the findings of 
Quattrone and Tversky (1988). This kind of violation of expected utility was the 
modal choice observed by Quattrone and Tversky. They reported a significantly 
higher frequency of deviations from utility theory in support of prospect theory 
(p=.000 by sign) than opposing to it, i.e., 43% against 8%. In difference to 
Quattrone and Tversky, the modal choices of ES and NES involve X and A –
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consistent with the prediction of expected utility theory. Nevertheless, XB was 
the second most frequent choice combination. Hence, we also find more 
violations in support of prospect theory than opposing to it. This result is 
significant for the non-experienced subjects (p=.074 by sign, 28% against 
22%), but not for the expert subject-pool (p=.172 by sign, 22% against 9%). 
3.6-The subject-pool effect 
 








Problem  A B A B A B 
1  Brown 0.67 0.41 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.50 
 Green 0.33 0.59 0.79 0.83 0.72 0.50 
   N  15 17  147  162  89 96 
2  Frank 1.00 0.82 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.39 
  Carl  0.00 0.18 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.61 
   N  15 17  147  162  91 89 
3  Program  J  0.20 0.50 0.81 0.69 0.36 0.54 
  Program  K  0.80 0.50 0.19 0.31 0.64 0.46 
    N  15  16  166 142 126 133 
4  Program  J  0.50 0.71 0.42 0.77 0.41 0.71 
  Program  K  0.50 0.29 0.58 0.23 0.59 0.29 
    N  14  17  146 156 125 126 
5  X  0.53 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.43 
  Y  0.09 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.18 
  X+Y  0.62 0.38 0.53 0.47 0.39 0.61 
   N  32   308   88  
 
Table 1 summarizes the relative frequencies of the experiments. In 
principle, as pointed out in the preceding sections, we find less support for the 
predictions of prospect theory than Quattrone and Tversky (1988). The data 
collected with the expert subjects exhibit no strict change of the modal choice 
from one part of a problem to the other as would be suggested by prospect 
theory.  
We were particularly surprised about two observations: On one hand, 
the expert sample displayed inconsistent behavior with prospect theory in 
problem 1 where their choices rather indicated risk loving in the domain of 
gains and risk aversion in the domain of losses. On the other hand, and very 
much against our intuition, the expert sample revealed preference reversals in 
problem 3 and 4 in which political programs were subject to positive or 
negative framing. 
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As the data of problem 5 suggest, experts seem to be less prone to the 
common ratio effect. A related result in some respect is that of Potters and Van 
Winden (2000) who found (weak) evidence for more rational behavior of experts 
in experiments. 
 
Table 2. Mantel-Haenszel Test of subject-pool differences (p-values)a 
 Problem  1 Problem  2 Problem  3 Problem  4 Problem  5 
  ES NES ES NES ES NES ES NES ES NES 
QT  .013 .097 .000 .060 1.00 .707 1.00 1.00 .049 .494 
ES   .945  .656  .049  1.00  .484 
a. Pair-wise one-tailed test. For a description of the test procedure see 
Conover (1999, p. 192). 
 
  The pair-wise between-subjects comparison suggests that the political 
choice pattern of the expert sample differed significantly to Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) in problems 1, 2 and 5. The p-values of these tests are reported 
in Table 2. Between the ES and the NES we find significant differences only in 
problem 3. Vis-à-vis these results, we conclude that culture, education and 




In this paper we have focused on the impact of expertise in a political decision 
making experiment. We examined, thus, whether some of the frequently 
reported rationality failures in presence of risk are merely systematic mistakes 
due to inexperience. The reported exploration is based on Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988)’s study of political choice problems. We compared their 
observations to the responses of both our subject-pools 1) real-world 
politicians and 2) inexperienced student subjects. 
As far as our sample size of experts permits to draw conclusions,14 our 
results may be summarized as follows: First, decisions of both politicians and 
(inexperienced) students do not support rational choice theory. Second, the 
decisions of experts, in contrast to student subjects, exhibit less risk aversion 
                                                           
14 The results are based on 32 expert subjects. Though this is a small sample size, Potters and 
van Winden (2000)’s review suggest that there has never been any experimental study with 
more experts. 
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in the domain of gains. This observation is consistent with earlier results by 
Dyer et al. (1989). Moreover, the data suggest that experts may be more risk 
averse in the domain of losses. This issue must be addressed further in the 
future, preferably in a context-free environment. Third, our data do not 
support loss aversion with respect to inflation and unemployment. Fourth , 
politicians are apparently not immune to framing effects. The expert sample 
exhibited significant (at 10%)  violations of procedure invariance. Fifth, and 
finally, experts’ decisions appeared less prone to the common ratio effect than 
inexperienced subjects. This suggestion would be consistent also with the 
observation of Potters and van Winden (2000) that experts choose relatively 
more rational. 
We also find significant subject-pool effects and, thus, must encourage 
Ball and Cech (1993)’s demand for a replication of experiments in which risk 
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